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LIBERTY’S REFUGE, OR THE REFUGE OF 
SCOUNDRELS?: THE LIMITS OF THE  
RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY 
ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Professor John Inazu‘s recently published book, Liberty’s Refuge: The 
Forgotten Freedom of Assembly,
1
 is a truly impressive achievement. It is a 
good book for all of the usual reasons: it is well-researched, well-written, 
and persuasive. But Liberty’s Refuge is more than just well done—it is an 
important book in the contribution it makes to our understanding of the 
First Amendment. In this book, Professor Inazu has discovered and 
reintroduced to the rest of us the lost history of a very important 
constitutional right—the right to peaceable assembly protected by the First 
Amendment. He successfully makes the case for the central role that this 
right played in historical understandings of the First Amendment, and then 
demonstrates how, in the past half century, this right declined and 
eventually was almost forgotten by both the Supreme Court and our 
society as a whole. That accomplishment is in itself a significant addition 
to our understanding of constitutional history, and one he should be proud 
of. 
Liberty’s Refuge, however, is not just a historical work; it is also a 
theoretical and normative one. Professor Inazu‘s theoretical focus is on 
how the decline of the assembly right, and its replacement by the modern, 
truncated right of expressive association, can be tied to other historical and 
philosophical developments of the 1950s and 1960s, notably the 
challenges posed by the McCarthy and Civil Rights eras, and the 
dominance of political philosophy by first the pluralism of Robert Dahl 
and then the liberalism of John Rawls. In particular, he notes how both of 
these philosophies, while purporting to provide an explanation and 
justification for liberal democracy, contained within them strong 
normalizing assumptions that tended to discourage radical difference and 
dissent. These tendencies influenced the courts in ways that lead them to 
 
 
  Professor of Law, University of California at Davis School of Law (aabhagwat 
@ucdavis.edu). Thanks to Dean Laura Rosenbury and the staff of the Washington University Law 
Review for organizing this symposium, and thanks to Professor John Inazu for writing such a 
wonderful book.  
 1. JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY‘S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY (2012). 
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transform a broad (and textual) right of assembly into a narrower (and 
nontextual) right of expressive association (as well as a narrow, for other 
reasons, right of intimate association). This explanation enriches our 
knowledge of how this doctrinal transformation occurred and succeeds 
unusually well in relating doctrinal evolution to the greater world, an 
accomplishment notably rare in legal scholarship. 
Finally, Liberty’s Refuge and Professor Inazu‘s previous work2 are an 
important component of an emerging scholarly focus on the role of 
broader First Amendment liberties, which seeks to undo some of the 
damage done by the myopic focus of the Supreme Court and most modern 
First Amendment scholars on the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment. This scholarship seeks to bring to the foreground First 
Amendment rights other than free speech, including not only assembly but 
also association and petition, and to understand the critical role that those 
rights play in the democratic process and popular self-governance.
3
 In the 
course of doing so, this scholarship seeks to help us understand in 
important ways how the various First Amendment liberties work in 
concert to advance self-governance, and indeed seeks to re-envision the 
nature of the democratic process itself.
4
 This scholarship, as a whole, has 
the potential to radically alter contemporary understandings of the nature, 
role, and significance of the First Amendment. Professor Inazu‘s particular 
contribution to this scholarship has been to reveal the central role that 
public assembly historically played in the democratic process, and the 
prominence that the assembly right historically held in the public 
consciousness. He also demonstrates the capaciousness of the assembly 
right, especially in contrast to the stingy scope the Supreme Court has 
given to assembly‘s modern cousin, the right of expressive association. 
And building on all of this, he provides a powerful argument for why it is 
worth rediscovering and reviving the Assembly Clause. He shows in 
particular that dissident groups, even nonexpressive groups, have 
important contributions to make to popular democracy and to the broader 
 
 
 2. See, e.g., John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565 (2010); 
John D. Inazu, The Strange Origins of the Constitutional Right of Association, 77 TENN. L. REV. 485 
(2010). 
 3. See, e.g., MARK E. WARREN, DEMOCRACY AND ASSOCIATION (2001); FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 543 (2009); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Clint A. Carpenter, The Return of Seditious 
Libel, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1239, 1299–1300 (2008); Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 
WASH. L. REV. 639 (2002). 
 4. See, e.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Changing the People: Legal Regulation and American 
Democracy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2011); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978 
(2011). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/5
  
 
 
 
 
2012] THE LIMITS OF THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY 1383 
 
 
 
 
process of developing and questioning our basic commitments as a 
society. This role, he shows, has been severely compromised by the 
Supreme Court‘s abandonment of assembly in favor of expressive 
association because modern law provides little protection to the internal 
autonomy of nonexpressive associations. This is not only a shame, but also 
a blow to constitutional values because nonexpressive associations, and 
the role they play in civil society, directly advance the underlying 
purposes of the First Amendment to protect the process of democratic self-
governance. 
In short, Liberty’s Refuge is an important book with a lot of original 
and interesting things to say about the First Amendment. In many ways, 
however, my favorite thing about this book is not just what it says, but 
how it says it. Impressively, while advancing strong and controversial 
positions, Professor Inazu somehow avoids the trap into which so much 
constitutional scholarship falls of purporting to provide a final and 
complete theory which provides the grounding for an entire area of law 
and rejecting all other perspectives as wrong-headed. Instead, this book 
self-consciously sets out to start a conversation about important questions: 
how and why forgotten First Amendment rights such as peaceable 
assembly should be revived, and what role assembly promises to play in 
the political process.
5
 This conversation promises to be a rich and exciting 
one. 
II. POINTS OF DIVERGENCE 
My praise for Liberty’s Refuge does not, of course, mean that I agree 
with everything that Professor Inazu has to say. My disagreements are not 
fundamental, yet they are not trivial either, and in some respects they may 
reflect more basic differences between us on the relationship between First 
Amendment liberties and the democratic process. 
Perhaps my greatest point of divergence is that I think Professor Inazu 
overemphasizes the expressive nature and purpose of assembly. The most 
telling illustration of this is his argument that private groups‘ choices of 
membership and leadership should be protected because ―the existence of 
a group and its selection of members and leaders are themselves forms of 
expression,‖6 and so any distinction between expression and conduct by 
groups, such as the distinction relied upon by Justice Ginsburg‘s majority 
 
 
 5. See, e.g., INAZU, supra note 1, at 17 (―The aspiration of this book is to get us thinking in that 
direction, not to insist that I have arrived at the best possible solution.‖). 
 6. Id. at 152. 
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opinion in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, is unsustainable.
7
 
Ironically, however, by rooting protection for assembly in its expressive 
nature, he falls into precisely the same error that he (correctly) lambasts 
the Supreme Court for. As he notes, the key, unfortunate turn in the 
Supreme Court‘s jurisprudence in the area of assembly and association 
was its abandonment of a stand-alone right of group autonomy, originally 
rooted in the Assembly Clause but later transmogrified into nontextual 
―association,‖ into a narrower right for groups to organize for expressive 
purposes alone. In other words, assembly/association became a subsidiary 
right to speech. This transition started with the founding association case, 
the Supreme Court‘s 1958 decision in NAACP v. Alabama, which relied 
on an association right to strike down Alabama‘s efforts, during the Civil 
Rights era, to force a civil rights organization to disclose its membership 
lists.
8
 It culminated in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, in which the Court 
rejected the Jaycees‘ claim to a First Amendment right to exclude female 
members on the (dubious) grounds that admission of women would not 
substantially interfere with the Jaycees‘ ability to communicate their 
views.
9
 The Court‘s key analytic failure in these cases, I would argue—
and have argued
10—is its failure to recognize that the right of group 
autonomy protected by the First Amendment (whether under the rubric of 
the Assembly Clause, as Professor Inazu convincingly argues it should be, 
or a under a nontextual right of association), while sharing common 
purposes with other First Amendment rights, is an independent and co-
equal right to the right of free speech. Assembly should be protected not 
because it is expressive, but because it independently advances the goals 
of the First Amendment—to say nothing of the fact that it is separately 
protected by the text of the First Amendment, without any hint that it is a 
subsidiary right to speech. Yet Professor Inazu‘s focus on the expressive 
nature of group membership as the reason for its protection seems to 
abandon that insight, and once again make assembly the handmaiden of 
speech. To the contrary, the reason private groups have a constitutional 
right to select their members and leaders is not because that selection is 
expressive, but because that selection is an essential aspect of assembly. It 
is indeed constitutive of assembly, since surely the right to assemble and 
associate is at core a right to choose whom to assemble and associate with. 
And again, the reason that the Constitution must protect such group 
 
 
 7. Id. at 148 (discussing Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010)). 
 8. Id. at 81–84 (discussing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)). 
 9. Id. at 132–35 (discussing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)). 
 10. Bhagwat, supra note 4, at 988–89.  
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choices is because a group which cannot define its own membership, 
leadership, and mission cannot play the critical roles that such groups must 
play in the process of self-governance. Groups whose membership is, to 
any significant extent, controlled by the government cannot possibly 
provide safe havens for citizens within which they can collectively 
organize, develop the skills needed for effective self-governance, and 
jointly develop their values and beliefs. Nor can such groups act as 
counterpoints to the power of the State, another essential role for such 
groups in maintaining the delicate balance between the People and the 
State that is at the heart of self-governance. The fact that group choices 
also have an expressive component is at best marginally relevant. 
Another point on which Professor Inazu and I diverge, which I suspect 
may point to some deeper disagreements, has to do with his analysis of the 
Supreme Court‘s decision in Lawrence v. Texas.11 In Lawrence, of course, 
the Court held that a Texas statute banning same-sex sodomy violated the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
12
 Professor Inazu 
describes the reasoning of the majority opinion in Lawrence (authored by 
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy) as relying purely on the theory that the Due 
Process Clause, as interpreted in Griswold v. Connecticut,
13
 protected 
certain forms of liberty, while ignoring an alternative approach built on the 
―right of intimate association.‖14 I fundamentally disagree. While Justice 
Kennedy‘s opinion in Lawrence is not always entirely pellucid about its 
doctrinal reasoning, and admittedly never uses the phrase ―intimate 
association,‖ the opinion repeatedly emphasizes that the core of the 
problem with statutes banning sodomy is that they ―do seek to control a 
personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in 
the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished 
as criminals.‖15 And again, in explaining why the Constitution protects 
private sexual conduct, the Court has this to say: ―When sexuality finds 
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can 
be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.‖16 In other 
words, Justice Kennedy was saying that the Due Process Clause protects 
liberty, in the form of sexual activity, precisely because that activity is a 
central aspect of an intimate personal bond. Far from abandoning intimate 
 
 
 11. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 12.  Id. at 564–79. 
 13. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 14. INAZU, supra note 1, at 139 (noting ―[t]he Court‘s avoidance of intimate association in 
Lawrence‖). 
 15. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
 16. Id. 
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association, the Court‘s opinion seems to whole-heartedly endorse the 
concept, placing it at the very center of the Court‘s ―privacy‖ 
jurisprudence. 
Our different readings of Lawrence may (though I confess uncertainty 
on this point) also point to a deeper disagreement between us regarding the 
relationship between ―intimate‖ and ―expressive‖ association. As 
Professor Inazu persuasively argues, a key moment in the development of 
the Supreme Court‘s jurisprudence regarding the right of ―association‖ 
occurred in 1984, in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.
17
 As noted earlier, 
the Court in that case rejected the Jaycees‘ claimed First Amendment right 
to reject female members.
18
 As Professor Inazu notes, in the course of 
doing so, the Court drew a sharp distinction between two forms of 
association: ―intimate association‖ among family members (and perhaps 
others, under Lawrence), protected by the Due Process Clause; and 
―expressive association‖ for the purposes of speech, protected by the First 
Amendment.
19
 He correctly criticizes this distinction, primarily because it 
seems to leave completely outside of constitutional protection 
associations, or assemblies, which are neither intimate nor primarily 
directed at expressive activities, but which nonetheless are worthy of 
protection.
20
 To this point, I could not agree with him more. I also agree 
with his criticism of the narrow ambit of the concept of intimate 
association, as originally developed by Kenneth Karst,
21
 because it fails to 
recognize that nonintimate associations can perform many of the same 
functions as intimate associations in helping individuals define themselves 
and develop their values collectively. Where I may part company with 
Professor Inazu is in my understanding of why the Constitution protects 
these sorts of activities. He seems to suggest that they are protected 
because they are intrinsically valuable.
22
 I disagree. I would argue that the 
Constitution is a structural document, and should be understood to protect 
not particular, substantive values, but rather a system of government—in 
particular, a system grounded in principles of popular sovereignty.
23
 Thus 
 
 
 17. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 18. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.  
 19. INAZU, supra note 1, at 132–33. 
 20. Id. at 136. 
 21. Id. at 136–37 (discussing Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE 
L.J. 629 (1980)). 
 22. See INAZU, supra note 1, at 136–38 (discussing values advanced by associations, including 
expression and ―self-definition‖). 
 23. For a more complete exposition of these ideas, examining their application to a wide range of 
constitutional disputes, see ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT, THE MYTH OF RIGHTS: THE PURPOSES AND LIMITS 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (2010). 
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the First Amendment protects a range of activities which directly enable 
the sovereign people to engage in activities relevant to self-governance, 
and to maintain a distance from, and control over, their government. These 
activities of course include exchanging ideas via speech and the press, but 
they also include petitioning, public assembly, and a host of other 
collective undertakings which help citizens develop their values, organize 
themselves, and when necessary place themselves in a position to assert 
their collective authority over public officials. That is the underlying 
theory of the Constitution. 
Enter assemblies/associations. Private groups protected by the right of 
assembly/association are of course relevant to self-governance because 
they provide vehicles for citizens to jointly express themselves. But more 
than that, such groups (including but not limited to religious assemblies) 
provide a crucial space within which citizens can develop their values and 
hone the skills needed for self-governance, shielded from the overbearing 
influence of the State.
24
 Citizens can also, through assemblies/associations, 
hope to have their voices heard by both fellow citizens and public 
officials, exert pressure on officials, and meaningfully participate in the 
process of self-governance, in ways that individuals acting alone have no 
realistic hope of accomplishing. In this regard, all groups, intimate and 
non-intimate, expressive and non-expressive, have a role to play. From 
this perspective, the reason why we protect intimate associations is 
precisely the same reason why we protect large, political 
assemblies/associations, such as the Sierra Club, and everything in 
between.
25
 The key question is whether an assembly/association is of a 
sort that I call a ―democratic association‖—one whose activities, broadly 
defined, are more than tangentially relevant to the process of self-
governance, also broadly defined. Even on the Court‘s view, intimate 
associations, such as nuclear families,
26
 and expressive associations, such 
as the Sierra Club, receive broad constitutional protection. But what about 
a group of longstanding and intimate friends? Or a book club, which 
sometimes reads nonfiction, political books? Or indeed, a book club that 
reads fiction? These types of groups don‘t easily fit into the Court‘s 
schema, but are clearly central to citizens‘ development of values and 
beliefs as well as political habits and skills. 
 
 
 24. See Bhagwat, supra note 4, at 997–98. 
 25. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that the reasons why we protect certain forms of intimate 
conduct, such as decisions on whether to bear children, may have similar roots. See BHAGWAT, supra 
note 23, at 225–60. 
 26. And even non-nuclear families. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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I think that Professor Inazu and I agree that all of these groups are 
worthy of constitutional protection. I am left, however, with two 
uncertainties. The first is grounded in my understanding that what 
Professor Inazu is proposing is to replace the Court‘s current ―expressive 
association‖ jurisprudence with the freedom of assembly. I am left with 
some doubts, however, whether this broad spectrum of groups can 
comfortably be situated within the freedom of assembly as he defines it. 
The second, and to my mind more profound difficulty, to which I now turn 
in more detail, is this: if we accept a capacious understanding of the types 
of private groups that are entitled to constitutional protection, then how do 
we go about determining the limits of that protection—i.e., what groups 
cannot claim the shield of the First Amendment?  
III. THE LIMITS OF ASSEMBLY 
It should be clear by now that in my view, Liberty’s Refuge makes an 
invaluable contribution to an important, emerging intellectual movement. 
In closing, I want to briefly consider an issue that Professor Inazu only 
touches upon lightly, but which I think in the modern era is likely to 
emerge as central: what the limits of the right of assembly are. There must 
be some limits. Presumably there is widespread agreement that no matter 
how strong the rights of private groups to select their members, 
commercial entities do not have a right to engage in racial (or other forms) 
of discrimination in selecting their employees.
27
 There are surely other 
limits as well. I want to focus, however, on a particular aspect of the 
boundary problem: at what point a private group becomes sufficiently 
threatening to the social order that it falls outside the right of 
assembly/association. This problem has been at the bottom of almost all of 
the great First Amendment disputes of the twentieth century from the 
foundational decision in Whitney v. California
28
 to the McCarthy era 
Communist prosecutions
29
 to the very recent case of Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project.
30
 While the problem of subversive 
associations had receded from significance at the end of the McCarthy era, 
today, in the Age of Terror, it appears to be regaining its prominent place 
(as Holder demonstrates). It is therefore incumbent upon us to re-examine 
this problem with fresh eyes. In this short space, and in emulation of 
 
 
 27. For a discussion of why this is so, see Bhagwat, supra note 4, at 1000–01. 
 28. 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
 29. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
 30. 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
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Liberty’s Refuge itself, my goal is to highlight some omissions and issues 
and start a dialogue, not to prescribe answers. 
A. Violent Assemblies 
In considering the scope of First Amendment protections for private 
groups that threaten the social order, the obvious starting point is, of 
course, the text. Notably, the First Amendment explicitly limits its 
protection to ―the right of the people peaceably to assemble.‖31 So a riot is 
not a protected assembly, and Professor Inazu notes, courts have used this 
limitation to also exclude from protection criminal conspiracies and ―even 
most forms of civil disobedience.‖32 Of course, this exclusion of ―unlawful 
assemblies‖ (a circular term if ever there was one) clearly is an extension 
of the constitutional text when applied to nonviolent conspiracies and 
peaceful civil disobedience, raising concerns about its scope and 
application. Professor Inazu recognizes this problem, and suggests that the 
solution may be to import the requirement of imminent violence from the 
Court‘s free speech doctrine (specifically, from the Brandenburg test for 
incitement)
33
 into the assembly area.
34
 For reasons I will come to, 
however, I have concerns that Brandenburg may not translate easily into 
the area of assembly/association. All we can seemingly say safely for now 
is that actual violence is of course unprotected, and through a sort of 
negative penumbra we can also probably exclude without much concern 
groups that are planning specific violence (i.e., violent conspiracies). As to 
nonviolent conspiracies (i.e., groups planning specific, nonviolent crimes), 
they do not fit well within the textual exclusion of non-peaceable 
assemblies, but it does not seem too controversial to suggest that groups 
whose primary aims are criminal make little or no contribution to the 
democratic self-governance, the underlying goal of the First Amendment, 
and so can safely be excluded from constitutional protections given the 
obvious, social harms they threaten. It should be noted, however, that even 
this seemingly uncontroversial exclusion can be problematic at its 
borders—for example, if a group planning a nonviolent act of civil 
 
 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
 32. INAZU, supra note 1, at 166–67. 
 33. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 34. INAZU, supra note 1, at 167 (―A similar danger once threatened our free speech jurisprudence 
and prompted the Court to protect advocacy short of ‗imminent lawless action‘ in that area of the law. 
An understanding of the peaceability constraint on assembly ought to operate with a similar 
deference.‖). 
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disobedience for political reasons was charged with conspiracy, before any 
law had been violated. 
Even in the context of violent assemblies, moreover, some uncertainty 
exists—notably, whether an individual who associates with a violent 
group, but does not himself or herself engage in or advocate violence, 
could nonetheless be punished. This was the core issue in Whitney v. 
California, and in that case the Court clearly held that mere membership in 
a subversive group was subject to prosecution, quite apart from actual 
participation in planning or engaging in violence.
35
 Furthermore, it is 
significant that when the majority affirmed Anita Whitney‘s conviction for 
criminal syndicalism, it clearly rejected claims rooted in ―rights of free 
speech, assembly, and association,‖36 and Justice Brandeis, in his iconic 
separate opinion, was equally clear that what was at stake was not just free 
speech, but also (and I have argued primarily) assembly.
37
 Indeed, the 
majority strongly suggests that the fact that assembly as well as speech 
was at stake weakened Whitney‘s claim because ―such united and joint 
action involves even greater danger to the public peace and security than 
the isolated utterances and acts of individuals.‖38 
It should be acknowledged, however, that even during the early period 
the Court did not always reject assembly and association claims related to 
subversive groups. Notably, in its seminal 1937 decision recognizing the 
freedom of assembly, De Jonge v. Oregon,
39
 the Court held that the 
freedom of assembly forbade a conviction simply for attending a lawful 
meeting held under the auspices of the Communist Party.
40
 And at the end 
of the McCarthy era, in Scales v. United States,
41
 it clarified that the First 
Amendment (in particular, the freedom of association protected by that 
provision) permitted only the punishment of ―active‖ membership in a 
subversive organization such as the Communist Party, requiring a showing 
that an individual ―specifically intend[s] to accomplish [the aims of the 
organization] by resort to violence.‖42 Finally, at the end of the 1960s, 
when the period of intense anti-Communism of the McCarthy era had 
passed, the Court overruled Whitney in Brandenburg v. Ohio and granted 
significant constitutional protection to radicals by requiring that violence 
 
 
 35. 274 U.S. 357, 371–72 (1927).  
 36. Id. at 371. 
 37. Id. at 372–79 (Brandeis, J., concurring); Bhagwat, supra note 4, at 983–84. 
 38. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372. 
 39. 299 U.S. 353 (1937). 
 40. Id. at 365.  
 41. 367 U.S. 203 (1961). 
 42. Id. at 229 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299 (1961)). 
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be both likely and imminent before speech could be prosecuted as 
incitement.
43
 It should be noted, however, that Brandenburg is quite 
explicitly a free speech case only, and provides little clarity on the status 
of protection for subversive groups.
44
  
Finally, whatever certainty had developed in this area of law has been 
thrown into doubt by the Court‘s 2010 decision in Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project,
45
 which raises some serious questions about the modern 
Court‘s willingness to grant substantial constitutional protection to 
association with dangerous private groups. At issue in Holder was the 
application of a federal statute banning the provision of ―material support 
or resources‖ to designated terrorist organizations, as applied to U.S. 
citizens seeking to provide peaceful legal advice and other training to 
designated terrorist groups, meant to facilitate only the lawful, nonviolent 
purposes of those groups.
46
 The Court conceded that application of this 
law imposed a content-based restriction on the plaintiffs‘ speech, but 
upheld the law because the Court, as a result of the national 
security/foreign affairs context of the litigation, deferred to executive and 
congressional findings that the law was necessary to control the violent 
activities of those groups.
47
 In concluding its free speech analysis, the 
majority emphasized that ―we in no way suggest that a regulation of 
independent speech would pass constitutional muster, even if the 
Government were to show that such speech benefits foreign terrorist 
organizations.‖48 In other words, the Court held that speech supporting 
terrorism was protected if it was engaged in unilaterally, but not if it was 
coordinated with (i.e., articulated in association with) a designated 
organization. Interestingly, however, the Court then went on to reject a 
freedom-of-association claim against the statute because the statute did not 
by its terms bar membership in designated organizations, but only material 
support to them.
49
 Thus the majority reached the peculiar result that 
association with and membership in a terrorist organization is protected, so 
long as the association does not in any way assist the organization—
leaving an interesting question about what exactly the majority meant by 
the word ―association.‖ Finally, however, it should be acknowledged that 
the precise reach of the holding in Holder is quite unclear because of the 
 
 
 43. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 44. Id. at 447–48. 
 45. 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).  
 46. Id. at 2712. 
 47. Id. at 2727–31. 
 48. Id. at 2730. 
 49. Id. 
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foreign affairs context which triggered judicial deference—indeed, the 
majority specifically recognized that its holding did not necessarily mean 
that ―Congress could extend the same prohibition on material support at 
issue here to domestic organizations.‖50 
In short, the current state of the law regarding the right to ―assemble‖ 
or ―associate‖ with groups that advocate or engage in specific violence is 
deeply uncertain, beyond the common ground that actual participation in 
or even planning of violence is unprotected. Can one be convicted for 
attending a meeting organized by an animal rights group that has been 
known in the past to vandalize laboratories and continues to support such 
conduct by its members? Or what about simply meeting with a domestic 
jihadi group that is planning violence, if the individual does not assist or 
commit to assisting violence? This latter issue is raised quite directly by 
the December 2011 conviction of Tarek Mehanna under the same 
material-support statute upheld in Holder, in that Mehanna‘s conviction 
was based not on any proof of actual plotting of violence, but rather on the 
facts that Mehanna distributed jihadi literature online and that he allegedly 
considered himself a part of Al Qaeda‘s ―media wing.‖51 Free speech 
doctrine would suggest that such conduct cannot be punished absent proof 
of imminent and likely violence,
52
 but as noted earlier it is not at all clear 
that the Brandenburg test was ever intended to cover assembly and 
association. Moreover, Holder casts grave doubts on the proposition that 
Brandenburg does apply, most notably by endorsing the idea, first 
advanced in Whitney, that mere association with subversive groups such as 
foreign terrorist groups ―helps lend legitimacy to [such] groups—
legitimacy that makes it easier for those groups to persist, to recruit 
members, and to raise funds‖ and so provides a justification for punishing 
such association.
53
 
B. Subversive Assemblies 
Once one moves beyond groups that are themselves violent, or are 
planning explicit violent (or other illegal) action, the problem becomes 
even murkier. What, in particular, are we to do with a group that advocates 
violence for political or ideological reasons in the abstract, but cannot be 
 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Abby Goodnough, U.S. Citizen is Convicted in Plot to Support Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
21, 2011, at A26.  
 52. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 53. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2725. 
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shown to be planning any specific violence? Examples of such groups 
abound. That is almost certainly the best description of the Communist 
Party (and other far-left parties) during the first Red Scare and during the 
McCarthy era, since in none of the cases sustaining prosecutions of 
Communists was any showing made of specific plans to engage in 
violence. In modern times, examples of such groups are legion, ranging 
from antiabortion groups to animal rights groups to neo-Nazi and 
survivalist groups to jihadi groups. Indeed, even an overly exuberant 
Occupy Wallstreet protestor who condemns bankers using intemperate 
language might fit into this category. 
Such groups can take two forms. First, there is the assembly that 
engages in pure, abstract advocacy of violence, stating that violence is 
justified for religious or ideological reasons, but does not itself plan to 
engage in any violence. Examples of such groups range from the 
Communist Party to jihadi congregations. Other groups, in combination 
with explicitly or implicitly advocating violence, might provide its 
members or third parties with specific information which might assist 
violence, such as information on how to construct a bomb,
54
 or 
information about potential victims, such as the addresses and photographs 
of abortion providers
55
 or others who for whatever reason are targeted for 
violence.
56
 In either case, the question posed is whether such groups, and 
members of such groups, can be prosecuted consistent with the strictures 
of the First Amendment. 
This is the core problem that has shaped the Court‘s First Amendment 
jurisprudence over the past century. The early answer given by a majority 
of the Supreme Court—once again, most clearly in Whitney v. 
California—was that such groups deserved no protection at all because 
they ―partake[] of the nature of a criminal conspiracy.‖57 Nor was this an 
isolated episode in American history. As Professor Inazu discusses in 
detail, the Court‘s failure to protect ―subversive‖ groups such as the 
Communist Party continued full bore during the McCarthy era, most 
notably in its affirmance of the Smith Act prosecutions of the leadership of 
 
 
 54. See, e.g., United States v. Featherston, 461 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 55. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(en banc). 
 56. See, e.g., United States v. White, 610 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 2010); Peter Slevin, Blogger’s Case 
Could Test the Limits of Political Speech, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2009, at A4; Hal Turner GUILTY: 
Blogger Convicted after Threatening Judges over Chicago Gun Ban, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 
2011, 6:20 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/13/hal-turner-guilty-blogger_n_681881 
.html.  
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the Communist Party in Dennis v. United States,
58
 and into the 1960s.
59
 In 
the past forty years, since Brandenburg was decided in 1969, there has 
undoubtedly been far greater legal protection, and societal tolerance, for 
such groups—though again, the 2010 Holder decision as well as the 
broader legal and social changes attendant to the ―War on Terror‖ do raise 
some serious questions about our continuing commitment in this regard. 
The question I pose here, however, is not what level of protection current 
law provides to such groups, but rather what level of protection we should 
provide. 
Professor Inazu‘s position on this issue seems relatively clear, albeit 
undeveloped. He explicitly criticizes the Dennis decision,
60
 and in the 
course of discussing the potential slippery slope problems associated with 
the traditional concept of ―unlawful assembly,‖ he advocates importing 
into assembly jurisprudence the Brandenburg test‘s requirement of 
imminent and likely violence.
61
 I wonder, however, whether the 
Brandenburg test is truly the best solution. Even in the speech context, for 
example, I have argued that Brandenburg overprotects certain forms of 
factual speech that facilitate violence.
62
 In the context of assemblies, 
however, the problem is even more serious. At heart, the difficulty lies in 
the fact that there is something to the Whitney majority‘s assertion that 
groups are more dangerous than individuals when it comes to advocacy of 
violence.
63
 The law recognizes this most obviously in the fact that it does 
not require violence to be imminent (or even likely) before prosecuting a 
conspiracy planning specific acts of violence,
64
 even though a whole-
hearted importation of Brandenburg into the assembly/association area 
would seem to impose such a requirement. And even with respect to 
merely subversive, but not explicitly violent groups, Brandenburg may not 
be adequate to the task. Groups are dangerous. A group of individuals who 
start off merely discussing the propriety or need for violence, as an 
abstract matter, can evolve into a group planning violence quite easily. 
 
 
 58. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
 59. INAZU, supra note 1, at 65–71, 84–87, 89–91. 
 60. Id. at 178. 
 61. Id. at 167.  
 62. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Details: Specific Facts and the First Amendment, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming Nov. 2012). . 
 63. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (noting ―[t]hat . . . united and joint 
action involves even greater danger to the public peace and security than the isolated utterances and 
acts of individuals is clear‖).  
 64. See United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 158 (3d Cir. 2009) (upholding conspiracy 
conviction while conceding that defendant‘s actions did not satisfy Brandenburg test); United States v. 
Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 114–15 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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Moreover, the very fact of a group, an assembly, arguably makes that 
transition easier. Individuals who interact with each other regularly, 
especially in some isolation from the broader community, can build up a 
set of shared, dissident values which can diverge dramatically from 
commonly held social beliefs. In general, we celebrate such diversity, but 
when those values touch on violence, this can be a profoundly dangerous 
process. Members of a group that endorses violence can build up each 
other‘s beliefs, form a sense of solidarity, and ultimately push each other 
on into a commitment to action. Of course, the same can happen to an 
isolated individual, but that seems a less likely or dangerous conversion 
(the occasional Ted Kaczynski notwithstanding). Indeed, in the incitement 
cases the Court was faced with individuals engaging in public speech, a 
situation where the danger of violence seems particularly distant since it 
requires converting others in the course of public debate to a violent path, 
a rather difficult undertaking.
65
 This is why the Brandenburg test has not 
been found to unduly sacrifice the social interest in preventing violence 
when applied to free speech. With subversive groups, however, the 
dangers of eventual violence seem much more substantial. 
Another way of thinking about this problem is from a law-enforcement 
perspective. There is no doubt that historically, the law was used to silence 
dissident and subversive speakers far too easily. In the post-Brandenburg 
era, we have constrained such uses of the law because of a broadly shared 
sense that speech is less dangerous than we thought, and repression more 
socially harmful. It is not clear, however, that that balance carries over 
easily when dealing with groups. Groups are important, and receive First 
Amendment protection, precisely because they are powerful vehicles for 
collective action that can build up their members‘ common values and 
commitments. While this is a critical part of participatory democracy 
generally, it can also be highly dangerous. In dealing with groups that 
advocate violence, meet regularly, and seem to be steeling themselves 
towards eventual action, is it really reasonable to expect law enforcement 
officials, and for that matter society at large, to wait until violence is both 
imminent and likely before action can be taken? Some greater flexibility 
does seem in order. 
On the other hand, it also seems clear that not all groups that support or 
advocate violence or unlawful behavior in the abstract can be denied 
constitutional protection. Such an approach would threaten to recreate all 
 
 
 65. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 
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of the pathologies of the Red Scare and McCarthy eras, with all the 
attendant harms to the democratic process. The need for some substantial 
level of protection for subversive groups is particularly important because 
there is no clear line between groups advocating violence and groups 
condemning particular social practices (whether it be abortion, animal 
testing, the activities of Wall Street, or what have you) in such strong 
terms as to induce violence in its members or third parties. For that reason, 
to deny all protection to groups which advocate violence, as Robert Bork 
once proposed,
66
 would threaten the existence of much of the radical 
fringes of our politics, both on the left and the right. The line-drawing here 
is extraordinarily difficult (and beyond the reach of this essay). Too much 
protection risks impeding legitimate social efforts to control violence and 
its sources. Too little protection risks falling into what Professor Inazu 
identifies as the pluralist trap, where the price of constitutional acceptance 
is conformity to majoritarian norms.
67
 And the line is inevitably a 
wavering one, turning on the (largely indeterminate) question of how 
likely a group is to evolve into violence. 
C. “Out” Assemblies and Protecting the Social Order 
Finally, it is worth noting that the problem of violent and subversive 
assemblies, and their place in the constitutional order, is only a subset of a 
broader set of questions surrounding the limits of societal tolerance for 
dissent and so-called ―out‖ groups. As Professor Inazu quite reasonably 
points out, the entire point of a constitutionally protected freedom of 
assembly is to protect such groups—dissenters who do not accept the 
basic, shared premises of contemporary liberal democracy.
68
 After all, 
groups located within the broader social consensus do not need protection 
from majoritarian politics. They also do not tend to push towards changing 
or reconsidering consensus values. Such challenges, however, are essential 
if a system of participatory democracy is to remain vibrant and flexible. 
We the People, after all, change over time, and one of the core purposes of 
a system of self-governance, and of the First Amendment, is to ensure that 
those changes can occur independently of the State, eventually to be 
reflected in the composition of the State. Thus in principle, we as a society 
 
 
 66. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 29–
32 (1971). 
 67. INAZU, supra note 1, at 97, 103–07; see id. at 155 (discussing Sheldon Wolin‘s distinction 
between ―diversity,‖ which pluralistic liberalism tolerated, and ―difference,‖ which it did not). 
 68. Id. at 156–58. 
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should celebrate, and certainly protect, all groups that challenge our 
values, even accepting that such groups will teach the propriety or 
necessity of acting contrary to those values. 
Obviously, there are limits to this principle. For one thing, the right of 
assembly (like the right of speech) cannot provide carte blanche to ignore 
the criminal law. Members of groups who center their identity on illegal 
conduct (whether it be violence, polygamy, drug use, or any number of 
other things) can be punished for their conduct, even though the practical 
effect of punishment is to eviscerate the group. And as noted earlier, some 
restrictions on groups who tend towards violence also may be permissible. 
But what about groups that threaten the social order in more subtle ways 
than actual law-breaking? Clearly we cannot condemn such groups out of 
hand, or all protection is lost. But should we protect them fully? 
Professor Inazu‘s instinct is clearly that we should, and at first blush I 
tend to agree. But even he concedes that ―fully‖ does not mean without 
limit. He reaches this conclusion in particular in response to the problem 
typified by the facts of Terry v. Adams.
69
 Terry involved a challenge to the 
Jaybird Democratic Association.
70
 The Jaybirds was a purportedly private 
group of Democratic voters in Texas.
71
 Every year, prior to the Democratic 
primary election, it held an election amongst its members, from which 
African American voters were excluded.
72
 The winner inevitably went on 
to win the Democratic primary, and then the general election (Republicans 
being in short supply in Texas at that time).
73
 The Jaybirds were not 
violent (at least as indicated in the facts) and shared a common ideology of 
racial exclusion.
74
 In Terry, the Supreme Court held that the Jaybirds‘ 
exclusion of black voters violated the Fifteenth Amendment, through an 
aggressive interpretation of the state action doctrine.
75
 The broader 
question, however, is whether the First Amendment protects the right of 
groups like the Jaybirds to exclude non-white voters, just as it protects the 
right of the Boy Scouts to exclude homosexual scout masters.
76
 Professor 
Inazu concludes that it does not, because the Jaybirds operated in 
―monopolistic or near-monopolistic conditions.‖77 Under the same 
 
 
 69. 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
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 71. Id. at 463.  
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principle, he concedes that a group that, for example, provides ―exclusive 
access to elite legal jobs‖ would also lose its presumptive constitutional 
right to select its members.
78
 Presumably (though he does not fully 
explain) this is because with respect to such a group, the line between 
―private‖ and ―public‖ begins to blur, as suggested by the Terry decision 
itself. 
While I agree with Professor Inazu as to the result in Terry, I think he 
may seriously underestimate the difficulties posed by his approach. For 
one, power does not require monopoly. What if we knew that access to a 
group, say, the Jaycees, was important in a particular community in 
building business contacts?
79
 Or a similar situation existed with a 
particular, all-White or all-Christian country club? To call such situations 
―monopolistic‖ strikes me as doing injury to language, but exclusion from 
such institutions matters in very pragmatic ways for the excluded. In those 
sorts of situations, are we truly comfortable saying that the balance must 
favor the exclusionary group‘s assembly rights? The fact is that such 
groups, like the Jaybirds, subvert the social order in meaningful ways by 
undermining the equality and inclusion norms which participatory 
democracy is built upon. Clearly, some challenges to social norms by 
exclusionary groups must be protected, which is why the Ku Klux Klan 
and the American Nazi Party retain their constitutional protection despite 
their abhorrent and exclusionary beliefs,
80
 but when the group at issue is 
not a triviality, and its exclusionary actions start to bite, the proper 
solution is no longer self-evident. 
Nor is the problem limited to exclusion and a group‘s right to choose 
its membership. One Nazi is not especially dangerous, unless violent. But 
many Nazis can be. During the process of Hitler‘s rise to power, he and 
his Nazi Party did not operate in ―monopolistic conditions‖ (though after 
he was elected he of course created a monopoly of power). And the 
problem was not exclusion—presumably his victims had no interest in 
joining the Nazi Party. But at some point, as the Nazis moved from the 
putsch-attempting fringe to a position of influence, did a line get crossed 
where even a society founded on principles of self-governance 
legitimately could have stamped out the Nazi Party (even if such a society 
could not silence Hitler himself until violence was ―imminent‖ and 
―likely‖)? 
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Indeed, the problem may be deeper than this. One of the characteristics 
of ―out‖ groups is that they tend to retreat from broader society to maintain 
their homogeneity and sense of identity. This is true of groups from the 
Amish and Shakers to survivalists and neo-Nazis. Of course, that retreat 
must be protected to some extent. But it is important to recognize that this 
separation itself causes substantial harm to the social fabric. Isolation 
breeds radicalism and makes it easier to de-humanize one‘s opponents. 
Such retreat is tolerable if the number of groups and individuals that take 
that path remains small. But if substantial parts of a society start to retreat 
from one another, danger lurks in the form of the breaking of the basic 
consensus needed to run a liberal democratic society.
81
 Of course, there 
seems little danger at present that the United States might suffer the fate of 
Yugoslavia or Iraq. But there is no doubt that the level of political and 
cultural consensus in this country has eroded in recent years, due in part at 
least to a splintering of society into ideological groupings which are 
increasingly extreme and isolated from one another. At what point may we 
deploy regulation to try and counter this trend without violating the 
freedom of assembly? The answer may be not at all, but the question is 
surely worth asking. 
IV. THOUGHTS ON A PATH FORWARD 
I close with some extremely preliminary thoughts on how the law of 
freedom of assembly/association might begin to take into account the 
concerns recounted above. Clearly in this limited space a full examination 
of this extremely complex set of questions is impossible. I do, however, 
wish to share a few thoughts on considerations that need to be taken into 
account in formulating a more complete approach, in order (in Professor 
Inazu‘s spirit) to begin a conversation. 
First and foremost, as Professor Inazu emphasizes, context matters 
tremendously.
82
 There can be no off-the-shelf answer to the question of 
when a private group crosses the line into being a sufficient threat to the 
social order to forsake constitutional protection. The same kind of group 
which in one context is sufficiently disempowered and realistically 
incapable of serious violence or harm (Nazis in Idaho) might well in 
different contexts clearly cross the line into subversion (Nazis in 1931 
Germany). Serious attention must be given to the role of a group in 
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society, its strengths and weaknesses, and its relationship to violence or 
other antisocial behavior, based on actual facts rather than conjecture. 
Obviously, this places a significant burden on public officials—law-
enforcement officials in the first instance, and eventually judges—to 
engage in reasoned and careful analysis, but there seems no escaping this. 
Second, following from the first, public officials, and the public more 
generally, need to have faith in the basic strength and unity of our society. 
Even in these politically divided times, there is little doubt that the vast 
majority of American citizens, of all political ideologies, races, religions, 
and cultures, share a basic commitment to liberal democratic values which 
make the risks posed by subversion far lower than in a profoundly divided 
society. Failure to recognize our bedrock strengths can easily lead our 
society to fall prey to the extreme fears and pathologies of the Red Scare 
and McCarthy eras. There is little doubt that terrorism is to our era what 
communism was to earlier eras, and extreme care needs to be taken to 
ensure that reasonable caution does not degenerate into panic and witch-
hunting.
83
 To date, judicial decisions dealing with enemy combatants and 
the detainees at Guantanamo
84
 suggest that at least the Supreme Court has 
avoided this pathology, unlike in earlier periods of panic, but Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project
85
 gives me pause. 
Third, precisely because of the danger that a sense of panic can invade 
not only the public conscious but the judiciary as well, vague tests are 
dangerous. They are particularly dangerous in our legal system because 
even if the Supreme Court has the political isolation and fortitude to act as 
a counterweight to the political branches, lower courts are far less 
insulated. There are good, empirical reasons to believe that even in 
contexts where the stakes are not nearly as high as with subversive and 
potentially violent groups, the lower courts systematically apply First 
Amendment and other constitutional doctrines developed by the Supreme 
Court in ways that are inconsistent with, and often less protective than, 
what the Court‘s precedents would seem to require.86 Certainly there are 
signs that in the context of the ―War on Terror,‖ the lower federal courts 
are inclined to be less protective of constitutional freedoms than the 
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Supreme Court.
87
 In view of these tendencies, any doctrinal formulation of 
the limits of the right of assembly must rely on relatively clear rules which 
place a high burden of proof on those seeking to deny constitutional 
protection to a particular assembly or association, if they are to provide 
any significant constitutional protection to dissident groups in practice. 
Fourth, in defining the limits of assembly, we must always keep in 
mind the deep link between freedom of assembly and democratic self-
governance. The freedom of assembly protected by the First Amendment, 
like the freedom of speech and the press, and the right to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances, is foremost and at heart a political 
liberty, designed to protect and enhance the process by which We the 
People govern ourselves.
88
 In recognizing this link, it is important to adopt 
a capacious understanding of the kinds of things that constitute self-
governance, rather than focusing narrowly on explicit political debate and 
voting.
89
 But nevertheless, self-governance and popular sovereignty lie at 
the heart of the First Amendment. As a consequence, the further a group 
strays from contributing to a democratic society, the less need there is for 
protection—recognizing all the time that such contributions can take many 
forms, including challenging the comfortably held shibboleths of the time 
and teaching nonconforming values, but not (as Justice Holmes might be 
read to suggest) violence against the social order.
90
 
Finally, we must recognize the interrelated nature of the great liberties 
protected by the First Amendment. In the Supreme Court‘s language, they 
are ―cognate‖ rights that are independent but oftentimes operate in 
tandem.
91
 Thus, when an assembly is also advancing other First 
Amendment interests, whether it be speech, religion, petitioning (or 
otherwise interacting with the State) or more broadly advancing 
participatory democracy, the right is at its strongest. This is not to say that 
we should not protect non-expressive, non-religious assemblies—that was 
the Court‘s grave mistake, which Professor Inazu correctly lambasts.92 But 
the further an assembly moves from the forms of political activism and 
 
 
 87. See, e.g., Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 
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value-formation protected by the First Amendment, the greater perhaps 
our willingness should be to balance the freedom of assembly against the 
need for social stability. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the past few pages, I have laid out some thoughts on what the limits 
might be to the right to freedom of assembly protected by the First 
Amendment with respect to so-called ―subversive‖ groups. The main 
contribution I hope to make here is not to identify what those limits should 
be, but rather to establish that there must be some limits. First Amendment 
scholarship and jurisprudence, however, has barely begun to think 
seriously about these questions, other than the tendency to borrow in an 
unthinking way from free speech law. On the ground, however, there is no 
doubt that in the Age of Terror government officials and judges are 
regularly posed with exceedingly difficult questions about how these 
limits should be identified, questions which tend to be skipped over or 
handled with breezy disdain, thereby seriously undermining the First 
Amendment. At the same time, an absolutist position, that an assembly 
loses constitutional protection only when it can be shown to threaten 
imminent and likely violence, seems to substantially undervalue the 
important social interests at stake here. It is time to begin a serious 
dialogue about how to reconcile constitutional liberties and legitimate 
social concerns in this area because we can surely do better than we have 
to date. 
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